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The break our watermarking system (BOWS) contest was launched in the framework of the activities carried out by the European
Network of Excellence for Cryptology ECRYPT. The aim of the contest was to investigate how and when an image watermarking
system can be broken while preserving the highest possible quality of the content, in the case the watermarking system is subject to
a massive worldwide attack. The great number of participants and the echo that the contest has had in the watermarking commu-
nity contributed to make BOWS a great success. From a scientific point of view, many insights into the problems attackers have to
face with when operating in a practical scenario have been obtained, confirming the threat posed by the sensitivity attack, which
turned out to be the most successful attack. At the same time, several interesting modifications of such an attack have been pro-
posed to make it work in a real scenario under limited communication and time resources. This paper describes how the contest
has been designed and analyzes the general progress of the attacks during the contest.
Copyright © 2007 A. Piva and M. Barni. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
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1. INTRODUCTION
The first break our watermarking system (BOWS) contest
has been organized by the Watermarking Virtual Laboratory
(WAVILA) of the European Network of Excellence ECRYPT
[1]. ECRYPT is a network of excellence funded within the In-
formation Society Technologies (IST) Programme of the Eu-
ropean Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme (FP6),
launched on February 2004 and lasting on July 2008. Its
objective is to intensify the collaboration of European re-
searchers in information security, and more in particular in
cryptology and digital watermarking. The activities of the
ECRYPT network of excellence are organized into five virtual
laboratories, the first four on cryptographic research activi-
ties, and the last one on watermarking and perceptual hash-
ing (WAVILA). WAVILA aims at building tools and tech-
niques for assessing the security aspects of watermarking and
perceptual hashing, to design advanced algorithms with a
well-defined security level, to design protocols, both stand-
alone as well as integrated in cryptographic protocols, and
to develop methods and techniques for eﬃcient and secure
implementations.
In the framework of WAVILA activities, it was proposed
to launch a contest that was named break our watermarking
system (BOWS). As suggested by the name, BOWS was de-
signed to allow the researchers interested in watermarking
to investigate how and when an image watermarking system
can be broken while preserving the highest possible quality of
the modified content, in case that the watermarking system
is subjected to a worldwide massive attack. The BOWS con-
test was not intended to prove how well-performing a water-
marking system is, but it was expected by means of this action
to better understand which are the disparate possible attacks,
perhaps unknown at the moment of the start of the contest,
the BOWS participants could carry out to perform their ac-
tion and comprehend the degree of diﬃculty of breaking the
embedded watermark.
In addition, the contest was designed to study if and how
much the knowledge of the watermarking algorithm is use-
ful for watermark removal. In fact, according to an approach
similar to the Kerckhoﬀs principle [2] adopted in cryptog-
raphy (stating that the security of a cryptographic scheme
should not rely on the secrecy of the cryptographic algo-
rithm but on one or more secret keys), watermarking secu-
rity is often analyzed by assuming that the attacker can have
full knowledge of the watermarking scheme and then he/she
can explicitly exploit such a knowledge to design a proper
attacking strategy. This assumption is based on the concept
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that the knowledge of the details of the watermarking algo-
rithm helps a lot the attacker. To study the importance of the
knowledge of the watermarking algorithm for watermark re-
moval, it was decided to divide the contest in two phases: in
the first phase the watermarking algorithm was not revealed
in contrast to the Kerckhoﬀs principle, in the second phase
the algorithm was made public, to allow the researchers to
sharpen their attacks with more information about the wa-
termarking scheme.
This paper describes how the contest has been designed
and analyzes the general progress of the attacks during the
two phases composing the contest itself.
2. DESIGN OF THE CONTEST
The general form of the contest was conceived in the fol-
lowing way: three grayscale images were watermarked with
a one-bit watermarking algorithm. The watermarked images
were available for download on the BOWS website at the ad-
dress http://lci.det.unifi.it/BOWS, whose homepage is shown
in Figure 1. After downloading, contenders were allowed to
try to erase the embedded watermark from the three images
by using any action they wanted while granting a minimum
PSNR of 30 dB between the watermarked image and the at-
tacked one. Note that the adoption of the PSNR as quality
measure automatically excluded from the set of available at-
tacks the geometrical modifications, since even a small geo-
metrical distortion, like a shift by one pixel, heavily aﬀects
the PSNR. To verify their action, attackers were asked to up-
load each of the three images (still in raw format and size
512 × 512) on the BOWS website through an ad-hoc inter-
face shown in Figure 2(a) to ask to run the detection pro-
cess; finally they obtained as answer the result of the detec-
tion and the PSNR achieved (Figure 3). In case of success-
ful attack, the thumbnail of the attacked image exhibited the
stamp “Passed,” as in Figure 2(b). When a BOWS participant
succeeded to remove the watermark from all the three im-
ages, he/she was asked to register in the hall of fame. The
best performances in terms of PSNR (average PSNR on the
three images when watermark deletion has been successful
over all of them) were stored by the system to fill in a rank
list updated in realtime. The attacker able to remove the wa-
termark from all the three images with the highest average
PSNR was the winner of the contest. At the beginning of the
contest, a limit of 30 uploads/day was fixed. To check it and
to log the working out of the contest, all the uploads were
recorded, according to the IP address of the client connect-
ing to the BOWS server. Afterwards this limit was removed
and set to 5000 images per day (per user).
2.1. Choice of the watermarking algorithm
The choice of the watermarking algorithm was dictated by
the following factors: (i) desire to test a modern system based
on the theory of side informed watermarking; (ii) necessity
of obtaining the consensus of the inventors of the watermark-
ing systems to use it in the contest; (iii) necessity of using
a complete system, including the exploitation of the human
visual system for better watermark hiding. With the above
Figure 1: The home page of the BOWS website, available at
http://lci.det.unifi.it/BOWS.
ideas in mind, the chosen watermarking algorithm was the
one designed by Miller et al. [3], with the agreement of the
authors, to be the object in the contest. While a detailed de-
scription of the algorithm can be found in the original paper
by Miller et al. [3], here it may be interesting to recall that
the watermark is embedded in the block DCT domain, in
the low-range portion of the spectrum (specifically, by con-
sidering a zigzag scanning of the block DCT coeﬃcients, the
watermark was inserted in the coeﬃcients ranging from the
second to the thirteen). Before embedding the DCT, coeﬃ-
cients were scrambled to avoid that bits were associated to
particular image area, thus weakening some of them and re-
inforcing others.
The watermarking strength was adjusted according to
Watson’s model [4], for a final PSNR ranging from 42 to
46 dBs (see Table 1). Whereas the original algorithm was
conceived as a multibit system, we turned it into a one-bit
scheme by inserting within the image a particular codeword
and asking to the detector to check whether the extracted
content was equal to the original one. No redundancy was
introduced in this step, since we decided to apply all the pro-
tection to the individual bits, by means of a dirty-paper trellis
mechanism (see the original paper for more details). While
this choice simplified the analysis of the false positive de-
tection rate and the transformation of the original multibit
scheme into a one-bit algorithm, the resulting algorithm re-
sulted more vulnerable given that even changing a few coeﬃ-
cients was enough to inhibit the correct watermark detection.
2.2. Choice of the host images
Three grayscale images, with diﬀerent visual characteristics
(Strawberry, Wood Path, and Church shown in Figure 4) in
raw format and size 512 × 512, were chosen for watermark-
ing. The three images were selected so to represent three dif-
ferent classes of images, namely images characterized by low
activity (the Strawberry), images with strong regular struc-
tures (the Church), and images with irregular textured con-
tent (the Wood Path). As it was evident from the contest re-
sults (and as it was expected), the Strawberry image was the
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Figure 2: The BOWS interface to upload the attacked images and run the detector, as it appears before a successful attack (a), and after a
successful attack (b) on the image Strawberry. Note that in case of successful attack the thumbnail of the image shows the stamp “Passed,”
and that the PSNR value achieved by the current attack is recorded.
Figure 3: The answer of the detector, with the PSNR value achieved
by the current attack.
Table 1: PSNR values of the three watermarked images with respect
to the original ones.
Image Strawberry Wood Path Church
PSNR 42.144 dB 46.198 dB 44.382 dB
easiest to attack by means of standard image processing tools,
while no particular diﬀerence could be observed with regard
to sensitivity attacks. The three original images were water-
marked with the adopted system obtaining the watermarked
versions exhibiting a peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) with
respect to the original ones included between 42 and 46 dB,
as it is described in Table 1. As it is shown, the distortions
introduced by the watermark embedding are lower for the
Wood Path image, whereas they are higher for the Strawberry
image.
2.3. False positives
An interesting question regards the false positive rate. The
detection parameters were set by fixing a (theoretical) false
positive rate of 2−40, however such a rate is computed by
considering nonattacked images, whereas one may argue
that pirates may also be interested in generating falsely wa-
termarked images. For this reason at the beginning it was
planned to create a section of the contest devoted to the
generation of false positive images, however for the sake of
simplicity this idea was abandoned. Nevertheless, in order to
keep the false positive rate under examination, we recorded
all the images for which the detector gave a positive answer
with a PSNR lower than 10 dB; at the end of the contest,
about 200 images still watermarked even with a PSNR lower
than 10 dB were recorded; this means that the rate of 2−12
was obtained; however, we can observe that these images do
not allow to estimate the true false positive rate, since most
of them are watermarked images that retained the watermark
even in the presence of a very strong attack (see [5] for an in-
teresting analysis of this aspect).
3. ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEST
As it has already been described, the contest consisted of two
phases: in the first phase the watermarking algorithm was se-
cret, whereas in the second phase it was made public. The
oﬃcial winner of the contest prize was decided to be the win-
ner of the first phase. In the following the two Phases are an-
alyzed, and a comparison between them is carried out.
3.1. First phase of the contest
The first phase of the BOWS contest started on December
15, 2005, and ended on March 16, 2006. At the beginning
of the contest the participants were able to remove the wa-
termark only on the image Strawberry: it seems that in this
image it was easier than in the other images to find and mod-
ify the watermarked features. It was then decided to remove
the limit on the maximum number of attacks per day in or-
der to allow the attackers to carry out also sensitivity attacks
[6–8] (actually, the limit was not removed, but fixed to a
value equal to 5000 attacks/day). Thanks to this modification
and to the growing advertisement of the contest, the number
of participants and uploaded attacked images increased alot.
At the end of the first phase of the contest, 72074 attacked
images were uploaded from more than 300 IP addresses; in
10034 of them (corresponding to the 13.9% of all the received
images) the watermark was erased while granting a mini-
mum PSNR of 30 dB between the watermarked image and
the attacked one. However, only 10 participants succeeded to
remove the watermark from all the 3 watermarked images,
and registered their data in the hall of fame. The steering
committee responsible to rule the BOWS contest, accord-
ing to the recorded results, confirmed that the winner was
the team held by Scott Craver, from Binghamton University,
with the following results: PSNR of the image Strawberry =
39.67 dB, PSNR of the image Wood Path = 39.65 dB, and the
PSNR of the image Church = 38.45 dB.
By analyzing the hall of fame at the end of the first phase,
it is possible to note that most of the successful attacks have
been registered in the last three or four days of the contest;
seven attacks obtained an average PSNR lower than 31 dB,
and only three were able to exceed 36 dB. The complete hall
of fame, as it appeared at the end of the first phase of the
contest, is given in Table 2.
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Figure 4: The three original images, Strawberry, Wood Path, and Church, used for the contest.
Table 2: Hall of fame at the end of the first phase of the BOWS contest.
Date Participant Institute Av PSNR (dB)
03/14/06 Team Craver Binghamton University 39.22
03/14/06 Team Craver Binghamton University 37.94
03/16/06 J. Earl Cambridge University 37.27
03/14/06 G. Le Guelvouit Capgemini 35.24
03/13/06 M. Noisternig Uni Salzburg 34.57
03/15/06 J. Earl Cambridge University 34.49
03/13/06 G. Le Guelvouit Capgemini 33.85
03/15/06 Team Dugelay Eurecom Image 33.65
03/15/06 P. J. Doets Delft University of Technology 33.54
02/12/06 S. Craver Binghamton University 33.23
03/15/06 A. Westfeld TU Dresden 32.86
03/14/06 A. Westfeld TU Dresden 32.45
03/13/06 P. J. Doets Delft University of Technology 31.60
03/15/06 J. Earl Cambridge University 30.73
03/08/06 D. Bogumil Warsaw University of Technology 30.61
03/16/06 I. Ocnarescu-A. David University Politehnica of Bucharest 30.59
03/13/06 F. Cayre LIS/INP Grenoble 30.59
02/02/06 G. Le Guelvouit Capgemini 30.48
03/16/06 I. Ocnarescu-A. David University Politehnica of Bucharest 30.44
02/02/06 A. Westfeld TU Dresden 30.40
3.2. Second phase of the contest
After the three months of the contest, it was revealed that
the watermarking algorithm used to embed the watermark
into the three images was the one developed by Miller et al.
[3]. Then, the BOWS website remained open for other three
months for the second phase of the contest during which the
researchers were allowed to sharpen their attacks by exploit-
ing the knowledge about the adopted watermarking scheme.
The hall of fame was not erased, but the participants entered
in the rank in the second phase of the contest were high-
lighted by a diﬀerent notation in the list. During these further
three months, the BOWS server received 721734 attacked im-
ages from more than 100 IP addresses; in 20666 of them (cor-
responding to the 2.9% of all the received images) the wa-
termark was removed while granting a minimum PSNR of
30 dB. In this second phase, 16 participants succeeded to re-
move the watermark from all the 3 watermarked images, and
registered their data in the hall of fame (some of them suc-
ceeded several times).
The contender reaching the highest PSNR value was An-
dreas Westfeld, from TU Dresden, that was also the most ac-
tive in the upload of attacked images, so that we were also
constrained to fix a limit, even though high (3000 attacks),
to the number of images uploaded by an IP address each day
not to overload the server. Andreas Westfeld at the end of the
contest obtained excellent values of the PSNR: for the im-
age Strawberry 60.74 dB, for the image Wood Path 57.05 dB,
and for the image Church 57.29 dB, with an average PSNR
value on the three images of 58.07 dB. By analyzing the hall of
fame concerning the second phase, it is possible to note that
all the best results have been achieved by A. Westfeld: if we
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exclude him, the best result was the one by Michel Chekral-
lah (EPSIL Lebanon) that reached 36.76 dB, whereas all the
other results are slightly higher than the minimum threshold
of 30 dB, being included between 30.11 dB and 31.53 dB, as
shown in Table 3, where the 25 records composing the hall of
fame of the second phase of the contest are shown.
3.3. First phase versus second phase
This section is devoted to the comparison between the results
obtained during the two phases of the contest, to try to un-
derstand if the knowledge of the watermarking scheme in the
last three months has been useful for the contenders. By an-
alyzing the results, summarized in Table 4, it is possible first
of all to note that a limited number of participants succeeded
to remove the watermark from all the three images, demon-
strating that the adopted watermarking scheme is highly ro-
bust. In fact, at the end of the first phase of the contest the
hall of fame was composed by only 20 records, whereas in
the second part 25 new successful attacks entered in. How-
ever, most of the contenders registered more than once in the
database, since they were able to increase the performance of
their attacks, so that actually only 10 participants succeeded
in the first phase, and 17 in the second one. In particular,
it is interesting to note that the best results were obtained
by researchers expert and well known in the watermarking
area. The attacks have been carried out by a high number of
clients in the first phase; in many cases, only a limited num-
ber of trials were applied by the contender, without remov-
ing the watermark, after which the contender refrained from
continuing the contest. This fact can be explained by assum-
ing that the first trials were carried out by people without
experience on watermarking that perceived the contest too
diﬃcult for their skills, and thus after a few trials decided to
stop their participation to the contest. In the second phase of
the contest, a lower number of contenders participated, but
with greater experience. The number of attacks in the sec-
ond phase was ten times the attacks in the first one; however,
the successful attacks were only twice as much, so that the
percentage of successes decreased a lot from 13.9% to only
2.86%, showing that in the second part of the contest the sen-
sitivity attack [6–8], based on a high number of uploads and
small changes in the parameters controlling the attack, was
heavily applied. This fact is confirmed when the number of
images uploaded by each IP address is analyzed. As a matter
of fact, the contest log files show that most images have been
received by computers used by A. Westfeld; in particular, his
attacks definitely prevailed in the second part of the contest
(we estimated that he uploaded more than 600.000 images),
whereas in the first one, his images represented about one
half of the attacks. These results indicate that A. Westfeld
made massive use of the sensitivity attack during the contest,
with particular reference to the second phase.
In Table 5, the ten best results of the BOWS hall of fame,
at the end of the six months of the contest, are shown; the
dates in italic highlight the successful attacks carried out in
the second phase of the contest. Within this ranking, five re-
sults belong to the first phase, and five to the second one,
so that it appears that both the two phases of the contest
achieved good results, even if the best three results were ob-
tained by A. Westfeld in the second period.
4. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACKED IMAGES AND
THE MOST SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS
In this section we give some more details about the more fre-
quent kind of attacks that have been applied during the con-
test, and most of all, about the quality of the attacked images.
4.1. Analysis of the attacks
Though several kinds of attacks were applied during the con-
test, the most successful ones were all linked to the sensitivity
attack. This fact seems to confirm the threat posed by this
kind of attack and the rather good maturity reached by the
watermarking field with respect to conventional image pro-
cessing algorithms. The above result is confirmed by the fact
that until the limit of 30 attacks per day was active no attacker
was able to enter the hall of fame.
From a scientific point of view, the most relevant results
regarded the development of techniques that helped to speed
up the sensitivity attack, given the huge computational and
communication resources necessary for the implementation
of such an attack in its original form.
By looking at the quality of the attacked images, we can
see that often the attacks concentrated on very small areas
of the image (see Figure 5, where a particular of an attacked
image Strawberry uploaded by A. Westfeld and exhibiting a
PSNR value of 41.21 dB is shown). This fact depends on the
choice of detecting the presence of the watermark only if all
the bits of the embedded message were correctly decoded.
It is clear that with this choice the optimum strategy from
a PSNR point of view consists in attacking only the blocks
bearing the weakest bit, whose position could be found by
some sort of sensitivity attack. More details about the most
successful attacks can be found in other papers of the present
issue of the EURASIP Journal on Information Security [9–
12], or in the papers presented during a special session of
Security, Steganography, and Watermarking of Multimedia
Contents IX conference, held in January 2007 [5, 13–17].
4.2. Quality of attacked images
Concerning the evaluation of the quality of the attacked im-
ages, the first result to be highlighted is that the extended
phase of the contest allowed to increase the mean PSNR of
the attacked images from 39.22 dB up to 58.07 dB. Here, the
increase of the PSNR during the contest representing the
measured perceptual quality of the attacked images with re-
spect to the watermarked versions is analyzed in more detail.
The quality of the attacked images is now evaluated from
a chronological point of view, by taking into account the
three images uploaded by the ten contenders that achieved
the best average PSNR values, summarized in Table 5. It can
be noted that in this ranking, 5 participants succeeded in the
first phase, and 5 in the second phase; to highlight more the
increase of performance achieved during the contest, we have
ordered the results not according to the decreasing average
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Table 3: Hall of fame of the second phase of the BOWS contest.
Date Participant Institute Av PSNR (dB)
06/12/06 Andreas Westfeld TU Dresden 58.07
04/05/06 Andreas Westfeld TU Dresden 51.08
03/24/06 Andreas Westfeld TU Dresden 41.00
03/23/06 Andreas Westfeld TU Dresden 37.78
06/02/06 Michel Chekrallah EPSIL Lebanon 36.76
04/10/06 Jonathan Vayn Eurecom 31.53
06/15/06 R.Vigoulette-S.Francfort France Telecom 31.12
06/14/06 R.Vigoulette-S.Francfort France Telecom 31.05
04/09/06 Bakhtiari Ahmad-Reza Eurecom 30.94
04/17/06 Javier Ramis ETSET Barcelona 30.79
05/20/06 Ehab M. Ghanem AAST 30.79
04/09/06 Cosson Romuald Eurecom 30.69
04/09/06 Cosson Romuald Eurecom 30.66
04/10/06 Dilmahomod Waziim Eurecom 30.61
04/10/06 Amjad Zoghbi Eurecom 30.53
04/10/06 KADRI Hiba Eurecom 30.52
04/10/06 Eduardo Ramirez Eurecom 30.50
04/10/06 Pierre Eurecom 30.47
04/10/06 Dilmahomod Waziim Eurecom 30.42
04/09/06 Kadri Eurecom 30.41
04/10/06 Jaroslaw Syrokosz Eurecom 30.40
04/10/06 Ghayati Eurecom 30.28
04/10/06 Oscar Morales Eurecom 30.26
06/12/06 R. Vigoulette-S. Francfort France Telecom 30.21
04/11/06 Olivier Beauvais Eurecom 30.11
Table 4: Summary of the results in the first phase versus in the sec-
ond phase of BOWS contest.
First phase Second phase
IP addresses 300 100
Attacks 72074 721734
Successes 10034 20666
% successes 13.90% 2.86%
Records in hall of fame 20 25
Participants in hall of fame 10 17
Av. PSNR of rank no. 1 39.22 dB 58.07 dB
PSNR value, like in Table 5, but in chronological ascending
order. In this way, the first five values represent results of the
first phase of the contest, and the last five are results of the
second phase. In Figure 6 a summary of these results is given:
the PSNR values between the attacked images and the water-
marked ones of each of the three images are represented in
the graphic. It is possible to note that all the improvement
of the results is due to the attacks carried out by Westfeld;
as a matter of fact, the only result of the second phase not
achieved by Westfeld, that is the one obtained by Chekrallah,
is comparable to all the results achieved by the best partici-
pants of the first phase.
Table 5: The ten best results of the BOWS hall of fame, at the end of
the two phases of the contest. The attacks carried out in the second
phase of the contest are the ones with the dates in Italic.
Date Participant Institute Av PSNR (dB)
06/12/06 A. Westfeld TU Dresden 58.07
04/05/06 A. Westfeld TU Dresden 51.08
03/24/06 A. Westfeld TU Dresden 41.00
03/14/06 Team Craver Binghamton Uni. 39.22
03/14/06 Team Craver Binghamton Uni. 37.94
03/23/06 A. Westfeld TU Dresden 37.78
03/16/06 J. Earl Cambridge Uni. 37.27
06/02/06 M. Chekrallah EPSIL Lebanon 36.76
03/14/06 G. Le Guelvouit Capgemini 35.24
03/13/06 M. Noisternig Uni Salzburg 34.57
4.2.1. Impact of distortion measure
During the contest, the choice of measuring the quality of the
attacked images by means of PSNR has sometimes been crit-
icized, since it is well known that such a measure does not re-
flect the way the human visual system perceives image degra-
dation. In order to verify the correctness of the adopted mea-
sure, we rearranged the hall of fame by considering diﬀer-
ent distortion measures. Specifically the following measures
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Figure 5: A particular of an attacked version of the image Straw-
berry uploaded by A. Westfeld and exhibiting a PSNR value of
41.21 dB; a modification of only a small number of blocks was
























































Figure 6: PSNR values between the attacked images and the water-
marked ones of the ten best attackers, in chronological ascending
order.
were considered: the mean squared error (MSE—basically
the same as the PSNR), the mean absolute error (MAE), the
maximum absolute error (MAXAE), and the mean structural
similarity index (MSSIM) [18]. A precise definition of the
above measures is given below; if X and Y represent the im-















∣∣x(i, j)− y(i, j)∣∣,
MAXAE = max
i, j
∣∣x(i, j)− y(i, j)∣∣.
(1)
Table 6: The ten best results of the BOWS hall of fame, reordered
according to the diﬀerent quality measures (averaged over the three
images). The attacks carried out in the second phase are the ones
with the names in Italic.
Participant (position) MSE MAE MAXAE MSSIM
A. Westfeld (1) 0.10 (1) 0.064 (1) 3.33 (1) 0.9996 (1)
A. Westfeld (2) 0.51 (2) 0.065 (3) 14.33 (2) 0.9991 (2)
A. Westfeld (3) 5.17 (3) 0.067 (4) 36.67 (7) 0.9984 (4)
Team Craver (4) 7.79 (4) 0.075 (2) 57.67 (9) 0.9982 (3)
Team Craver (5) 10.45 (5) 0.090 (6) 86.67 (10) 0.9978 (6)
A. Westfeld (6) 10.84 (6) 0.098 (8) 125.67 (3) 0.9975 (5)
J. Earl (7) 12.21 (7) 0.099 (5) 206.33 (8) 0.9974 (8)
M. Chekrallah (8) 13.70 (8) 2.019 (10) 216.00 (6) 0.9748 (7)
G. Le Guelvouit (9) 19.46 (9) 2.385 (7) 230.67 (4) 0.9680 (10)
M. Noisternig (10) 22.71 (10) 2.571 (9) 230.67 (5) 0.9514 (9)
The structural similarity index (SSIM) compares local pat-
terns of pixel intensities that have been normalized for lumi-
nance and contrast,
SSIM(x, y) = [l(x, y)]α·[c(x, y)]β·[s(x, y)]γ, (2)
where x and y are subregions of the images X and Y , l(x, y),
c(x, y), s(x, y) are respectively the luminance, the contrast
and the structure comparison functions, properly weighted
by means of the exponents α, β, and γ. The local measures










Let us note that with MSSIM, greater values indicate greater
image quality, while with MSE, MAE, and MAXAE greater
values indicate lower qualities.
In Table 6 the hall of fame reordered according to the
above criteria is shown. As it can be seen, the ranking changes
with the diﬀerent measures; however, the best result of the
contest does not change; if we concentrate on the analysis of
the best results of the first phase, the winner would still be
S. Craver, with the only exception of the MAXAE, where the
best result is achieved by G. Le Guelvouit. These results con-
firm that no particular diﬀerences would have been obtained
by using a diﬀerent quality measure, at least for the winners
of the two phases of the contest.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In the framework of the activities carried out by the Eu-
ropean Network of Excellence for Cryptology ECRYPT, the
BOWS contest was designed to allow to investigate how and
when an image watermarking system can be broken though
preserving the highest possible quality of the modified con-
tent, in case that the watermarking system is subjected to
a worldwide attack. During the six months of the contest,
about 800 000 images were uploaded into the BOWS server
to carry out the attacks on the selected images, coming from
more than 300 diﬀerent IP addresses. The results of the sec-
ond phase were deeply influenced by the massive use of the
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sensitivity attack. In any case, we believe that the initiative
was a success, and will give many hints to the research in the
watermarking area. We then decided to maintain open the
BOWS contest website, by adding links to papers related to it,
and by allowing interested people to download the attacked
images of the best ten contenders, analyzed in the previous
section.
In general, the validity of the contest tool to analyze the
security and robustness of practical watermarking schemes
and to stimulate new research in the area has been widely rec-
ognized. We believe that the whole watermarking commu-
nity will resort more often to this kind of activity in the future
(indeed at the moment of writing a second BOWS contest has
already been launched, see http://bows2.gipsa-lab.inpg.fr for
more information about this initiative).
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